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Abstract  
Development cooperation relations between the European Union (EU) and 
African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) group of states has provided a vehicle for 
the UK’s ongoing relationship with the majority of the Commonwealth, although 
this has been widely overlooked in the run up to the UK referendum and its 
aftermath. Membership of the EU has provided the UK with the opportunity to 
collectivise its obligations to ACP Commonwealth states and a framework for its 
development cooperation relations across the Global South. This has augmented 
British leadership in global development and the alignment of development 
policy and practice at the global, regional and national levels. This paper argues 
that withdrawal from the EU would be a lengthy and costly process that 
threatens to undermine the UK’s position in global development, current levels 
and sources of development funding and existing and nascent trade relations. 
While this will present particular challenges for ACP commonwealth states, there 
may also be opportunities to propose and advocate for alternative frameworks. 
However, recent changes to the UK’s post referendum political leadership does 
not augur well for those hoping for a roll back of pressures for liberalisation and 
associated reforms.  
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 Much of the public debate in the run up to the UK referendum on European 
Union (EU) membership harked back to a bygone age of Empire. The special 
relationship that Britain has with the Commonwealth was portrayed as 
abandoned or neglected due to the UK’s EU membership which had supposedly 
diverted British attention solely to its near European neighbours. “We should 
reflect on how Britain’s continuing membership of the EU is holding the nation 
back from fostering stronger trading links with Commonwealth countries” 
(Chabe 2016). Brexit therefore was presented as an opportunity to re-engage 
with neglected partners for mutual benefit, with UK interest in the 
Commonwealth re-invigorated.  
 
This discourse, however,  neglected the deep and long-standing relationships 
that the UK has enjoyed with Commonwealth countries via its membership of 
EU. The EU has supported development cooperation relationships with 
countries across the Global South, linking it and its member states via a policy 
framework based on trade and aid. The most long-standing of these 
relationships is the partnership between the EU and the Africa, Caribbean and 
Pacific (ACP) Group of states. Of the 53 Commonwealth states, only 11 are not 
part of the EU-ACP partnership.1 This paper therefore argues that the EU-ACP 
relationship has provided an important framework for development 
cooperation relations between Commonwealth states. In addition, and 
particularly in the wake of the inertia of the Doha Round of the World Trade 
Organisation (WTO) negotiations, the UK, as part of the EU, has developed a 
range of bilateral trade relations with non-ACP Commonwealth states, including 
the much vaunted EU-Canada agreement (now held up as a potential model for 
the UK’s post-Brexit future).  
 
The lack of recognition of the UK’s relationships with third countries conducted 
via the EU has become evident in post-referendum analyses of the complexity 
of Brexit and the arrangements and negotiations that would be required to 
enact it. This is particularly evident in the area of development cooperation, and 
the debate about how to replace the broad range of relationships that the UK is 
currently party to as a EU member state. This article therefore aims to 
contribute to that debate via an exploration of the remit of the EU’s relationship 
with the Commonwealth via the EU-ACP partnership, and the likely impact of 
Brexit on the UK’s relationship with the ACP Commonwealth states.  
                                                     
1 These are the Asian Commonwealth states (Bangladesh, Brunei Darassalam, India, 
Malaysia, Maldives, Pakistan, Singapore, Sri Lanka), Canada, Australia and New Zealand. All 
other Commonwealth states are either members of the ACP or the EU (in the case of Malta, 
Cyprus and the UK).  
 The Commonwealth ACP and the European Union  
The relationship between the EU and Commonwealth states in Africa, Caribbean 
and the Pacific was a direct result of the accession of the UK to the EU (then EEC) 
in 1973, and the need to accommodate the UK’s existing trade and development 
relations with its former colonies. The model for this relationship was already 
established as two of the founding members of the European Coal and Steel 
Community and then EEC, France and Belgium had had their extensive relations 
with colonies and former colonies accommodated via the Treaty of Rome in 
1957. This had resulted from France’s insistence that the newly established 
common market would be open to its dependencies. The Europe–Africa 
Association Agreements provided the trade and aid framework for these 
relations, with the granting of colonial trade preferences to the wider EEC 
arguably acting as a ‘carrot’ for the maintenance of a ‘Franco-African Union’ 
(Langan 2016). 
 
The Association Agreement included a European Development Fund (EDF) for 
the provision of aid to the associated countries. This collective arrangement for 
the original European six (Germany, France, Italy, Belgium, Netherlands and 
Luxembourg) was the cause of some dispute. Germany in particular queried 
whether it should be required to support a development funding pot that in 
effect collectivized the costs of French and Belgian colonial administrations 
among the EEC Six. Additionally, there were conflicts over the spending within 
the EDF which was regarded as supporting colonial interests. Indeed, Nkrumah 
viewed European provision as a mechanism for collective neo-colonialism, 
acting as a ‘Trojan Horse’ for the interests of former colonial powers (Langan 
2015:113).  
 
In 1963 The Association Agreement was replaced by the Yaoundé Accords 
(1963-1975), which provided for reciprocal market opening and trade between 
the signatories. There was dissatisfaction, particularly from African leaders, 
about the emphasis on liberalization which was feared would undermine 
prospects for industrialization and value addition in developing countries. This 
dissatisfaction, coupled with the accession of new member states to the EEC in 
1973, prompted the reformulation of the relationship from the Yaoundé 
Accords to the Lomé Convention.  
 
Prior to its accession to the EEC, the UK had conducted trade with colonies and 
former colonies via a System of Commonwealth Preferences. The decision to 
join the EEC prompted the reformulation of this system. Through the creation 
of the ACP group, Commonwealth states in Africa, the Caribbean and the Pacific 
were combined with those already associated to the EEC to form a new alliance 
of states in the Global South that would partner the EEC in the area of trade and 
aid. This group shared a collective identity as former colonies, and in spite of 
their heterogeneity, have continued to maintain a collective identity. Ravenhill 
(1985) suggests that through this alliance the ACP enacted a collective form 
clientelism, to maximize outcomes from an unequal and neo-colonial 
partnership. The UK in turn had, like France before it, collectivized responsibility 
for its former colonies (and the associated financial burden), while at the same 
time securing access to a significant market.  
 
The newly created Lomé Conventions were based on non-reciprocal trade 
preferences coupled with commodity stablisation mechanisms. Each agreement 
had a five-year duration, and were renegotiated five times 1975 and 2000. The 
ACP were required to negotiate and agree as a bloc, however the EEC was often 
accused of utilizing divide and rule tactics to broker coalitions in order to achieve 
support for their position. While formerly a partnership of equals it was often 
critiqued as an asymmetrical relationship in which the EEC/EU was able to 
leverage its position. While the regime maintained the UK’s influence and 
relationship with its former colonies it also brought special access for those 
states to the European Market and the newly created Single Market in 1985.  
 
In addition to Lomé’s trade provisions, development aid continued to be 
provided through the EDF. While initially this was mainly in the form of grants 
‘with no strings attached’, over time aid became increasingly conditional and 
accompanied by an associated shift to programming, which was justified on the 
basis of weak efficiency and progress. Programmed aid became conditional on 
commitments to free market reform, Structural Adjustment Programmes 
(SAPs), and core ‘political’ elements of good governance, the rule of law, 
democracy and human rights.  Recently there has been a perception that EU aid, 
in the Post Washington Consensus era, has been untied  from structural 
adjustment, however Langan (2015) argues that, particularly via budget support 
mechanisms, it remains tied to ‘premature trade opening and economic 
liberalization’. The EU therefore has been able to leverage free market reform 
to the detriment of the needs of the poor ( Nunn and Price 2004; Langan 2013).  
 
EU pressure for liberalization was particularly evident in the reform of the Lomé 
relationship and its replacement by the Cotonou Partnership Agreement in 2000 
(Nunn and Price 2004). Under the guise of WTO compliance, non-reciprocal 
preferential trade was replaced by a reciprocal free trade regime based on 
Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs) between the EU and regions within 
the ACP. While formally the ACP group remains as a partner of the EU, the EPAs 
have subdivided the group into 7 regional groupings each with their own 
negotiating schedules and trade arrangements with the EU. As with all 
international agreements concluded between the EU and the third parties, the 
European Commission negotiated these partnerships on behalf of the EU and its 
member states, although individual states retain the authority to conclude 
commercial agreements with external partners, such as the UK’s 2015 trade deal 
with India (Peers 2015). 
The UK has been central to the ongoing liberalization of the EU-ACP trade 
regime, in concert with the European Commission and Germany which both 
have also been key advocates of free trade (Elgstom 2008). The UK’s position 
however combined liberalization with an explicit focus on social development 
and pro-poor strategies.  In 2005 Peter Mandelson, EU Commissioner for Trade 
proclaimed “I believe in progressive trade liberalisation. I believe that opening 
of markets can deliver growth and the reduction of poverty” (quoted in Elgstom 
2008). This position would bring the UK into conflict with the Commission, but 
was ultimately successful in foregrounding social development concerns within 
the reform of the EU- ACP agreement (Elgstom 2008).  
 
The Cotonou Agreement had set a schedule for the conclusion of the EPAs as 
2008, however this vastly underestimated the complexity of the negotiations. 
This was intensified as the regional associations within the ACP bloc required 
reform and restructuring at the same time as the new EPAs were to be 
negotiated. As a result, the EPA process remains incomplete and is subject to 
ongoing negotiations and agreement. 
Notwithstanding, through this framework the UK, via its membership of the EU, 
currently has free trade agreements (either awaiting ratification, adoption or 
already in force) with 32 commonwealth countries of the ACP.  In the majority 
of cases, these relationships are embedded in regional groupings that 
encompass both commonwealth and non-commonwealth states, as well as a 
range of development levels. This will add complexity to the UK’s attempts to 
withdraw from the EU trade agreements and formulate its own separate 
arrangements. Moreover, the range of the trade relationships between the EU, 
the ACP and beyond, reveal the extent of agreements the UK would be required 
to replace should it decide to leave the EU. Brexit therefore presents much 
uncertainty about how this will impact on future relationships.  
 
In the event of a UK exit from the EU, the EU will maintain its relationships with 
the Commonwealth via the Cotonou Agreement and EPAs while Cyprus and 
Malta will remain EU member states. For ACP Commonwealth states this will be 
important. While traditional patterns of trade remain, UK accession to the EU 
had diversified Commonwealth trade patterns. Since 2000 EU-ACP trade flows 
have more than doubled, representing 5% of EU exports and 5.4% of EU imports, 
up respectively from 1.5% and 1.8% in 2000 (European Commission 2016). The 
ACP is the EU’s 7th most important trading partner, and it accounts for 24% of 
ACP imports and 17% of ACP exports (Commission 2016). ACP exports to the EU 
are dominated by Africa and minerals, for example in 2014 Africa accounted for 
97.6% of ACP exports to the EU and South Africa alone for almost a quarter 
(21.6%). Only 4.2% of ACP exports to the EU originate in the Caribbean and 0.3% 
of the Pacific region (European Commission 2016).  
 
These aggregate figures mask the continued reliance of the ACP Commonwealth 
states on the UK market.  For example, the banana market the UK, which 
consumes more bananas per capita than any other EU member state, is the 
prime export market for Caribbean states such as St Lucia, whose main export 
commodity is bananas (Flood-Beabrun 2016). The current EU-ACP trade regime 
provides ACP bananas with duty free access to the UK and EU market, which is 
an advantage not enjoyed by largescale Latin America exporters. Without this 
concession bananas produced on small family farms ‘would not be able to hold 
their own against the banana produced on the vast continental plantations’ 
(Flood Beabrun 2016). Brexit therefore could threaten the livelihoods of small-
holders and undermine wider sustainable development objectives.  ACP 
Commonwealth countries will undoubtedly seek to maintain their preferential 
access to UK markets, and expect the UK to match the trade benefits that are 
enjoyed with the rest of the EU. This pressure to at least mirror existing 
agreements will be relatively unproblematic for the trade in primary 
commodities, however the complexity of EU Rules of Origin will have an impact 
on the negotiations and the shape of the new agreements. If the UK does not 
provide a trade framework to replace these relationships on similar terms, these 
markets could be lost. This is a particular concern for commonwealth states in 
the Caribbean, not least as this group of states has already secured and 
established their EPA arrangements with the EU.   
 
For other ACP countries, the referendum has provided a breathing space in the 
current EPA negotiation and ratification process. ACP states, particularly in 
Africa, have been concerned about the impact of EPAs and trade liberalization, 
something that in part explains the length of time the new relationships have 
taken to complete. While the EU presented a forceful and unified front in the 
negotiations, the sub-groupings of the ACP were in a relatively weak position to 
counter pressures for liberalization. The Brexit referendum however has given 
some pause, with for example Tanzania quoting Brexit as a reason for its 
decision not to progress with its EPA negotiations (Crawford 2016).  
There might be some optimism that a post-Brexit UK could offer a new and 
preferable alternative to the EU-EPAs. Yet the UK has been a keen advocate of 
liberalization and an agent of change in the EU’s development cooperation 
relations. Commentators such as Siles-Brugge (2016) and Murray-Evans (2016) 
have argued that it is likely that the shape of the UK’s post-Brexit trade relations 
will be underpinned by increased liberalisation rather than less. Furthermore, 
given the range of relationships that the UK will need to renegotiate, the ACP 
Commonwealth are unlikely to be at the forefront of UK concerns (Siles Brugge 
2016).  Although Africa has some of the fastest growing economies in the world, 
the negotiating priorities will be focused on states with significant economic 
might, such as Canada. Within the discussions for these new relationships the 
capacity of the UK as a trade negotiator is likely to be tested. Siles Brugge (2016) 
argues that, the UK’s negotiating leverage will be diminished due to its reduced 
size and attractiveness of the British market (outside the EU).  While this might 
be the case for relations with economically larger states, the UK will still wield 
power in relation to economically smaller and more dependent states, 
particularly if its aid regime continues to be tied to trade provisions.  
  
The implications of Brexit for UK - ACP Commonwealth Aid Relationship 
 
The uncertain future of UK trade relations in the context of a withdrawal from 
the EU is mirrored in relation to the provision of development aid via the EDF. 
The EDF is funded by direct contributions from EU member states, and sits 
outside of the EU budget. The allocation of EDF financial assistance has 
increasingly been tied to the concept of Aid for Trade with a focus on trade 
development and private sector growth. In accordance with this the current 11th 
EDF is based on the objectives of poverty eradication, sustainable development 
and the gradual integration of the ACP states into the world economy with 
special treatment for LDCS. It also has a commitment to the provision of €30.5 
billion of development assistance to the ACP between 2014-2020 (EU 
Commission 2016). In 2014 the UK contributed approx. 15% of the EDF (€ 4.5 
Bn), making it the 3rd largest contributor after Germany (€6.28, 20.58%) and 
France (€5.43 billion, 17.81 %) (Ransome 2016, Commission 2013).  The UK’s 
national aid budget is primarily delivered via DFID, which then provides aid 
bilaterally to selected focus countries and to a wider range of countries via 
multilateral delivery systems. Within this distribution, the European 
Commission is the largest recipient of UK multilateral funds (UKAN 2016) (see 
Figure 1) .   
Through this multilateral provision the UK has secured a key leadership position 
at both the regional and global level. It has been at the forefront of directing EU 
external assistance towards its own pro-poor priorities and coordinating 
approaches within the Millennium Development Goals, the Sustainable 
Development goals and the framing of the post 2015 climate. This prime 
position at the EU level has in turn secured the UK’s position as a global leader 
in development, not least as the EU 28 are largest donor group in the world 
providing half of all international aid (Watkins 2016)   
Rather than diminishing the UK’s global role, EU membership has enhanced its 
position. Watkins (2016) argues the British contribution to European 
development funds represents a good investment as it extends the geographic 
reach of UK aid, including to places where the UK has a limited and declining aid 
presence. Moreover, UK leadership in EU development cooperation has allowed 
it to leverage EU aid to enhance Dfid’s objectives, and in turn to achieve its 
national goals (Watkins 2016). Certainly the close correlation of policy 
orientation between the global, regional and national level is evident, with DFID 
recognizing its developmental outcomes ‘result from the collective action of 
countries and diverse development partners’ (Department for International 
Development [DFID] 2013).  
 
 
  
  
  
  
Figure 1 Share of UK core multilateral aid going to the main multilaterals.  
Source: ‘DFID Annual Report and Accounts 2011-12’, DFID, June 2012, p201 reproduced in 
UKAN 2016.  
 
Within the EU, the UK has been able to forge important partnerships with ‘like-
minded’ states, such as Denmark, Sweden and the Netherlands, that have both 
augmented the UK’s position and reinforced their collective identities as 
development advocates (Elgstrom 2008). Laurant (2016) argues that Brexit 
would mean “loss of the valuable, progressive and pro-development voice and 
perspective of the UK in framing EU development policy”. Moreover, the 
benefits and efficiency of coordination, for example joint planning by EU donors 
in 40 countries and joint programming in 16, would be lost (Watkins 2016).  
The UK currently has spending commitments to the 11th EDF for the next 4 years. 
It is uncertain what impact Brexit would have should it occur before 2020. While 
there is no provision in the EDF for the event of an exit by a contributor member 
state, it does provide for the situation of a new state acceding to the EU. In that 
case the contributions of member states can be amended by unanimous Council 
decision acting on a Commission Proposal. Whether, in the event of a UK exit, 
the Council would unanimously agree to increase other member states’ 
individual contributions to cover the shortfall is questionable. By implication, 
the EDF might be facing a potential reduction in the next four years and then 
after, or the UK might be expected to respect its commitments as part of the 
Brexit negotiations.  
There is also uncertainty about how Brexit might affect the European 
Investment Bank. The UK is currently the institution’s biggest investor, with 17% 
of EIB capital. Brexit is therefore likely to cause instability and uncertainty for 
this institution which will be compounded by currency volatility. Mendez-Parra 
et al (2016) have predicted Brexit could provoke a 10% devaluation of the 
pound. In addition, they predict that there could be a lowering of UK gross 
domestic product (GDP) (-3%) and British exports to developing countries.  Their 
predictions imply a reduction in the value of aid by $1.9Billion with the 
combined cost (through aid, trade and remittance) of the devaluation for 
developing countries to be $3.8 billion (Mendez-Parra et al 2016). This is in the 
context of conditions in which many developing countries are already facing 
multiple shocks, lower oil and commodity prices, a stronger US dollar and a 
slowing Chinese economy (Aglionby 2016). Kenya’s central bank governor 
predicted that Brexit could pose a greater risk to his country than China’s 
slowdown, due to the impact of financial market volatility and reduced 
investment (Aglionby, 2016).  
In the event of Brexit there will be pressure placed on the UK to transfer its 
current commitments from the EU either to its own bilateral funding or to 
alternative multilateral funding mechanisms such as the World Bank. For 
example, Flood-Beabrun (2016) has called for the lost UK contribution to EDF to 
be replaced by bilateral development finance, particularly increased Aid for 
Trade. However, there has recently been a significant reduction in the number 
of recipients of UK bilateral aid. DFID’s Bilateral Aid Review reduced the number 
of recipients from 78 in 2010/11 to 28 in 2012, with Pakistan, Ethiopia and 
Nigeria targeted as the key recipients for 2014/15 (UKAN 2016). Until this point 
the narrowing of bilateral focus has been accompanied by the UK’s continued 
commitments to multilateral frameworks, thus maintaining Britain’s influence 
and role. The reorientation of aid from multilateral to bilateral channels 
threatens to diminish the UKs position in global development as well as 
requiring a significant increase in administrative capacity and a long process of 
bureaucratic reform.   
 
The changes to the UK’s political leadership in the wake of the referendum do 
little to allay concerns over the future of development funding, nor the 
commitment to social development initiatives that are not directly linked to free 
trade. The appointment of Priti Patel as the new Secretary of State for 
International Development reflects the sentiments of the current British 
government and the Brexit wing in particular. Prior to her appointment Patel, a 
key advocate of Brexit, characterized international aid as a ‘low priority’ for 
government. She argued that aid spending should be orientated to securing the 
British national interest and that DFID should be replaced by a Department for 
International Trade and Development ‘to enable the UK to focus on enhancing 
trade with the developing world and seek out new investment opportunities in 
the global race” (Patel quoted in Tapsfield 2016). The appointment of Patel 
therefore raises questions about the future both of UK aid commitments and 
DFID itself.  Chakrabortty (2016) argues that while it would be difficult for Patel 
to reject the UK aid commitments of 0.7% GDP, she will be more likely to erode 
it. Rather than the ‘pro-poor’ focus that has defined the UK’s position, 
Chakrabotrry (2016) predicted there will be more focus on orientating aid 
towards middle income states such as South Africa that would boost UK trade 
interests abroad. For the poorest Commonwealth states, and those with small 
and remote markets, this re-orientation would pose a significant threat.  
.  
 
Conclusion  
  
The referendum and prospects of a UK exit from the EU have created much 
uncertainty about the future of development cooperation at the national, 
regional and global levels. There has been much under-estimation of the extent 
of change required in order to disaggregate UK relationships from the wider 
network of EU’s external agreements. Without doubt the negotiations to both 
to leave the EU and to restructure UK relations with the rest of the world will be 
lengthy and costly, although the extent of that remains unknown.  
 Brexit will necessarily require the UK to reformulate its relations with the 
Commonwealth. As this paper has shown, accession to the EU fundamentally 
changed UK’s trade and aid relations with ACP states (both in Commonwealth 
and beyond). It also provided an opportunity for ACP Commonwealth States to 
access European markets and development funding, and strengthen relations 
with non-Commonwealth ACP states. Those relations will remain in the event of 
UK withdrawal, although it is uncertain what shape EU development 
cooperation will take in the absence of UK.  
 
Membership of the EU has enhanced UK leadership in global development. 
Through the collectivization of aid commitments and administration, the UK has 
been able to secure influence throughout the Global South and has shaped the 
policy framework through which this has been delivered. A decision to leave the 
EU could undermine that leadership, threaten sources and levels of 
development funding and create uncertainty about the future of EU and UK 
trade relations. While this will present challenges, for critics of the UK’s policy 
orientation and the sustained emphasis on liberalization within EU’s external 
relations this might present an opportunity to improve the basis of those 
relations and develop alternative development frameworks which truly reflect 
the needs of the poor.  
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Appendix  
Commonwealth members ( * indicates ACP membership)  
 
Africa 
 
Caribbean and the 
Americas 
 
Europe Asia 
 
Pacific 
 
1. Botswana * 
2. Cameroon * 
3. Ghana * 
4. Kenya * 
5. Lesotho * 
6. Malawi * 
7. Mauritius * 
8. Mozambique * 
9. Namibia * 
10. Nigeria * 
11. Rwanda* 
12. Seychelles * 
13. Sierra Leone * 
14. South Africa * 
1. Antigua and 
Barbuda * 
2. Bahamas * 
3. Barbados * 
4. Belize * 
5. Canada  
6. Dominica * 
7. Grenada * 
8. Guyana * 
9. Jamaica * 
10. Saint Lucia * 
11. St Kitts and 
Nevis * 
12. St Vincent 
1. Cyprus  
2. Malta  
3. UK  
 
1. Bangladesh  
2. Brunei 
Darassalam  
3. India  
4. Malaysia  
5. Maldives  
6. Pakistan  
7. Singapore  
8. Sri Lanka  
 
1. Australia  
2. Fiji * 
3. Kiribati * 
4. Nauru * 
5. New 
Zealand  
6. Papua New 
Guinea * 
7. Samoa * 
8. Solomon 
Islands * 
9. Tonga * 
10. Tuvalu * 
11. Vanuatu * 
15. Swaziland * 
16. Uganda * 
17. United 
Republic of 
Tanzania * 
18. Zambia * 
 
and The 
Grenadines * 
13. Trinidad and 
Tobago * 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ACP member states 
 
1. Angola  
2. Antigua and 
Barbuda 
3. Belize  
4. Bahamas  
5. Barbados  
6. Benin  
7. Botswana 
8. Burkina Faso  
9. Burundi  
10. Cameroon  
11. Cape Verde  
12. Comoros  
13. Central African 
Republic  
14. Chad  
15. Congo 
(Brazzaville)  
16. Congo (Kinshasa)  
17. Cook Islands  
18. Cte d'Ivoire  
19. Cuba  
20. Djibouti 
21. Dominica  
22. Dominican 
Republic  
23. Eritrea  
24. Ethiopia  
25. Fiji  
26. Gabon  
27. Gambia  
28. Ghana  
29. Grenada 
30. Republic of 
Guinea  
31. Guinea-Bissau  
32. Equatorial Guinea  
33. Guyana  
34. Haiti  
35. Jamaica  
36. Kenya 
37. Kiribati  
38. Lesotho  
39. Liberia 
40. Madagascar 
41. Malawi 
42. Mali 
43. Marshall Islands 
44. Mauritania 
45. Mauritius  
46. Micronesia  
47. Mozambique  
48. Namibia  
49. Nauru  
50. Niger  
51. Nigeria  
52. Niue  
53. Palau 
54. Papua New 
Guinea 
55. Rwanda 
56. St. Kitts and Nevis 
57. St. Lucia 
58. St. Vincent and 
the Grenadines 
59. Solomon Islands 
60. Samoa 
61. Sao Tome and 
Principe 
62. Senegal 
63. Seychelles 
64. Sierra Leone 
65. Somalia 
66. South Africa 
67. Sudan  
68. Suriname 
69. Swaziland 
70. Tanzania 
71. Timor Leste 
72. Togo 
73. Tonga 
74. Trinidad and 
Tobago 
75. Tuvalu 
76. Uganda  
77. Vanuatu 
78. Zambia 
79. Zimbabwe 
 
